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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Plaintiff raises several issues on appeal which were not 
raised at the Trial Court level. In addition, in the Brief of 
Appellee, Ginger E. Rowe, her "Statement of Case" is only partially 
correct and omits certain crucial facts; for example, plaintiff 
omits that at the time of the plaintiff's Order to Show Cause 
hearing on March 17, 1992, defendant had already filed his own 
action to modify the Texas Decree (Case #92-4400164; (R Pg. 25); 
which was consolidated before the Trial Court (R Pg. 199, Addendum, 
Exhibit 1) at the said hearing. Therefore the Trial Court had not 
only the plaintifffs request for enforcement of child support 
payments, but also defendants request for modification based upon 
his change of material circumstances at the hearing held on March 
17, 1992. Defendant made it clear in his pro se appearance that 
he was unemployed and was before the Court for a modification (R. 
Pg 703, Lines 22-24; Addendum, Exhibit 2). The Commissioner 
acknowledged this by stating, "Well, you have a right to come in 
on your modification." (R. Pg. 704, Lines 1-2; Addendum, Exhibit 
2) . But the Commissioner completely failed to address the issue 
of the changed circumstances of the parties and simply enforced the 
Stipulation, without obtaining any additional evidence. Defendant 
contends this was error. Plaintiff contends that this was harmless 
error—but it was not harmless to defendant since it made him 
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liable for excessive child support payments from the date of the 
Stipulation and made the same amounts enforceable against him 
progressively, without taking into account the material changes in 
circumstances of the parties. All of this was done without 
compliance to the applicable statutes and in violation of 
defendant's right to due process of the law. Further, the 
plaintiff claims that if the Stipulation is not enforceable, then 
the Satisfaction of Judgment signed by plaintiff is not valid. 
However, the facts show that plaintiff received $11,000.00 for her 
Satisfaction of Judgment and therefore has received consideration 
and made the satisfaction binding. 
ARGUMENT 
I- PLAINTIFF'S ISSUES NOT RAISED IN TRIAL COURT: THEREFORE 
CANNOT BE RAISED NOW. 
The plaintiff, in her reply brief, raises for the first time 
the issues covering the following: 
a. Binding nature of the Stipulation on the Court; 
b. Statutory requirements were satisfied; 
c. Harmless error; 
d. Court's adoption of Stipulation supported by fact; 
e. Non-Waiver of Stipulation; 
f. Failure to marshall evidence; 
g. Meeting of the minds on the Stipulation; and 
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h. No improper execution of the Order on Order to Show 
Cause. 
In fact, the plaintiff in the Court below never filed any 
formal documents opposing the documents, affidavits, motions and 
objection to the Commissioner's Order on Order to Show Cause filed 
by defendant. The only document filed by plaintiff was the 
submittal request for a ruling to Judge Christensen (R Pg. 367; 
Addendum, Exhibit 3) . She thereby waived her right to raise any 
issues thereafter. Since none of the items (a) through (h) above 
were raised at the Trial Court level, they cannot now be raised on 
Appeal. Wurst v. Dept. of Employment, 818 P. 2d 103 6 (Utah App. 
1991) . Further, a look at the transcript of the oral argument 
before the Commissioner plainly shows that not only did plaintiff 
not argue any of items (a) through (h) above, but that her sole 
argument was that the Stipulation (R Pg. 108) either be enforced 
or not be enforced (R Pg. 680; Addendum, Exhibit 2). 
II. PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS NOT BASED UPON THE RECORD. 
Plaintiff alleges that she sent the Stipulation to the Court 
on September 26, 1989 along with a cover letter indicating that 
she was not represented by counsel; however, the record does not 
show the original of this letter, nor is this statement supported. 
In fact, a copy of it does not show up in the record until March 
17, 1992, 2 1/2 years later, submitted by plaintifffs attorney at 
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the Order to Show Cause Hearing held March 17, 1992 (R 103 and 
109). Contrary to this, the letter from the Commissioner's clerk 
to defendant's attorney rejecting the Stipulation and Order was 
mailed on January 18, 1990, indicating that he was the one who in 
fact filed the documents (R Pg. 87) . The foregoing shows the 
confusion in the mind of the plaintiff in remembering the facts. 
However, it is clear from the defendant's letter of September 10, 
1990 that the parties had earlier discussed the matter and 
plaintiff knew that the Stipulation had not been accepted by the 
Court (R Pg. 191; Addendum, Exhibit 4) and in his affidavit, 
defendant further states "he advised her (plaintiff) of the same" 
(R Pg. 193, 57; Addendum, Exhibit 5). In addition, the plaintiff 
was not being paid the $900.00 per month required by the 
Stipulation (see R Pgs. 173-189; Addendum, Exhibit 6) and defendant 
told her this in early 1990 (R Pg. 191 Addendum, Exhibit 4). 
Further, the statements in plaintiff's letter pertaining to her 
being not represented by counsel are not correct since plaintiff's 
attorney did not withdraw until October 20, 1989, well after 
September 26 of the same year (R Pg. 86; Addendum, Exhibit 7). In 
addition, contrary to plaintiff's statements of fact that she was 
not notified, both the Court's Order to Show Cause (R Pg. 88; 
Addendum, Exhibit 8) and its Order of Dismissal (R Pg. 96; 
Addendum, Exhibit 9) show that plaintiff was copied by the Court. 
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In addition, the defendant notified plaintiff himself (R Pg. 193 
f7; Addendum, Exhibit 5). Therefore, the record shows that the 
plaintiff was well notified that the Stipulation had been rejected 
by the Court. But plaintiff did nothing; but why should she, she 
was living in Colorado. 
III. HARMLESS ERROR 
To argue that the actions of the Trial Court were harmless 
error is to mistake the term. Harmless is if no injustice is done, 
and there is no reasonable likelihood that the error effected the 
outcome. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P. 2d 789 (Utah 
1991) . While the defendant supports the proposition that adequate 
child support needs to be paid, it needs to be assessed based upon 
the guidelines passed by the Legislature and the Trial Court cannot 
substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature. The plaintiff 
bases her theory of harmless error on speculation and not facts 
stated under oath before the Court. The record is devoid of any 
compliance with the applicable statutes. Further, to say that 
defendant is not harmed by the Court fs actions is to ignore the 
actualities of the case and facts as they exist before the Court. 
Clearly defendant thought the Stipulation had been voided by the 
Trial Court. He wrote to plaintiff and told her so (R pg 191; 
Addendum, Exhibit 4) in his letter of September 10, 1990, reminding 
her of their earlier discussions on the subject, also reminding 
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plaintiff that she could not expect the $900.00 per month agreed 
to in the Stipulation, as he was only bound by the $700.00 per 
month Ordered by the Texas Divorce Decree. Plaintiff accepted the 
lesser amount (R pgs. 173-189; Addendum, Exhibit 6). The plaintiff 
made no attempt to change the Court's actions on the 1988 case 
until 1992 when the defendant brought his action for modification 
(case #92-4400164) (R pgs. 1-49), at which time she reasserted the 
Stipulation. By asserting that the Trial Court committed harmless 
error in adopting the Stipulation nunc-pro-tune, without complying 
with § 78-45-7.3(3) or § 78-45-7, the plaintiff misses the vital 
and cardinal fact that the defendant only raised this argument with 
respect to the Order to Show Cause Hearing held on March 17, 1992. 
The defendant accepts the actions of the Commissioner to be in 
keeping with the statutes in what he did in 1988-89, in rejecting 
the Stipulation, denying the Order, and dismissing the case. But 
it is his complete reversal on the March 17, 1992 Order to Show 
Cause hearing — without any additional documents or facts, and in 
contravention of the statutes, that defendant claims as error. 
Further, the action of the Commissioner was harmful because: 
(a) Commissioner Substituted His Own Wisdom for That of the 
Legislature. The legislature has clearly said that when the 
5 
Commissioner has before him a modification request, he must obey 
the following: 
UTAH CODE ANN, § 78-45-7. Determination of amount of support -
Rebuttable guidelines. 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount 
granted by prior Court Order unless there has been a material 
change of circumstances on the part of the obligor or obligee• 
(2) If no prior Court Order exists, or a material 
change in circumstances has occurred, the Court 
determining the amount of prospective support shall 
require each party to file a proposed award of child 
support using the guidelines before an Order awarding 
child support or modifying an existing award may be 
granted. 
(3) If the Court finds sufficient evidence to rebut 
the guidelines, the Court shall establish support after 
considering all relevant factors, including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the 
child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; and 
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the 
obligee for the support of others. 
If the matter is uncontested, the Court then has to follow the 
following: 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.3 Procedure — Documentation -
Stipulation 
(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the moving 
party shall submit: 
(a) a completed child support worksheet; 
(b) the financial verification required by 
Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and 
(c) a written statement indicating whether or not 
the amount of child support requested is consistent with 
the guidelines. 
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under 
Subsection (1) is not available, a verified 
representation of the defaulting party's income by the 
moving party, based on the best evidence available, may 
be submitted. 
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may 
only be offered after a copy has been provided to the 
defaulting party in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure or Title 63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative 
Procedures Act, in an administrative proceeding. 
(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving 
parties shall submit: 
(i) a completed child support worksheet; 
(ii) the financial verification required by 
Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and 
(iii) a written statement indicating whether or not 
the amount of child support requested is consistent with 
the guidelines. 
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall 
be used to review the adequacy of a child support Order 
negotiated by the parents. 
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or combined 
child support and alimony is adequate under the guidelines if 
the stipulated child support amount or combined amount exceeds 
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the total child support award required by the guidelines. 
When the stipulated amount exceeds the guidelines, it may be 
awarded without a finding under Section 78-45-7.2. 
Whether the matter is contested or uncontested, it is obvious 
that the Legislature wanted some documentation under oath from the 
parties to indicate that the guidelines had been substantially met. 
That the Commissioner did not do this on the March 17 Order to Show 
Cause hearing is not argued. (See page 10 of Appellee's Brief 
where it is admitted.) 
(b) Decisions Must be Based Upon Facts Before Court. 
In her attempts to call the error harmless, the plaintiff has 
cited allegations from pleadings filed by the defendant which were 
not made under oath. Plaintiff has then speculated as to what the 
defendant's income may have been in 1986, 1987, and 1988 to produce 
a child support guideline which is not part of the record, and is 
therefore objected to as speculative and irrelevant. This is 
exactly what the Legislature did not want judges to do. Plaintiff 
then cites the Law Review Article by Judge Billings - which 
appropriately enough was entitled "From Guesswork to Guidelines." 
But the plaintiff's argument is simply just that — "guesswork," 
since the Trial Court had failed to obtain the current evidence on 
the parties1 financial status, and material changed circumstances, 
if any, to give it some evidence to comply with the guidelines. 
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(c) Commissioner Violated Due Process, 
In both the 1988 hearing and the 1992 hearing, the 
Commissioner had before him the modification of the Texas decree. 
In one instance, he applied the statutes, in the second, he did 
not, without any further evidence before him. This provides for 
an unpredictable, uneven, and personalized standard of justice that 
the Legislature has tried to avoid and Courts must not allow to 
happen. Perhaps the greatest harm was that the defendant was not 
allowed his day in Court. By not following the statutes, the Court 
deprived him of due process by not allowing him to state his 
material change of circumstances upon which the Court could have 
then made an informed decision. It does not matter what the 
parties agreed to in 1988 in the Stipulation if the circumstances 
have materially changed—the Trial Court must listen to the 
evidence on the change. THIS THE COURT FAILED TO DO. Defendant 
has essentially been denied due process of the law by the 
Commissioner's actions. Because the defendant signed a Stipulation 
in 1988 based upon his circumstances and ability to pay child 
support at that time, does not mean that he is bound by it for the 
rest of his life. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(1) allows for the 
modification and case law allows for voidance and repudiation of 
a Stipulation, Kline v. Kline, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah 1975) and 
they are not binding upon the Courts, Clawson v. Clawson, 675 P.2d 
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562 (Utah 198 3). Therefore, the Commissioner, based upon a reading 
of the Stipulation only, and without any supporting evidence, and 
upon the false premise that the Stipulation had not been filed with 
him in the 1988 case, adopted the Stipulation. This was also based 
upon the false premise that the Stipulation was binding upon the 
parties because plaintiff had given a Satisfaction of Judgment in 
a Utah Administrative Law suit. However, the record clearly shows 
the payment of $11,000.00 to plaintiff as consideration for the 
same (R Pg. 136; Addendum, Exhibit 11) . In addition, since the 
Stipulation was never adopted in 1988, it does not follow that if 
the Commissioner's Order, on Order to Show Cause is set aside, that 
the Satisfaction of Judgment must also be set aside. The law 
provides for changes in conditions of the parties which would 
permit the reduction of child support and therefore upon a proper 
showing, the child support part of the Stipulation may be modified 
without the Satisfaction of Judgment also being set aside since the 
modification is based upon material changed conditions. But the 
Court must hear evidence to determine if the changed conditions are 
in fact material and would in fact allow for a modification to the 
Texas decree. It is clear that Commissioner Maetani was 
sidetracked by the arguments of plaintiff's attorney at the oral 
presentation of March 17, 1992. But it was only argument and the 
Commissioner should not have been persuaded that he only had two 
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decisions before him, i.e., the enforcement or the non-enforcement 
of the Stipulation (R Pg. 680; Addendum, Exhibit 2) nor that the 
only thing he had before him was the question of the Stipulation 
(R Pg. 691, lines 10-12; Addendum, Exhibit 2) and that it was 
controlling (R Pg. 687, lines 7-8; Addendum, Exhibit 2). As the 
record shows, the Commissioner, upon the urging of plaintiff's 
attorney, was convinced that the entire question of the enforcement 
of the Stipulation evolved around the failure of defendant's 
attorney to file the same in 1988. He states this seventeen (17) 
times in the transcript (R Pgs. 679, 683 (twice), 684, 685 
(thrice), 692, 695 (twice) 696, 704, 705 & 708; Addendum, Exhibit 
2). That this belief was plain error is evidenced by his clerk's 
letter (R Pg. 121; Addendum, Exhibit 10) indicating that the 
Stipulation had been filed and rejected by him in 1988. Surely the 
holding of the Utah Supreme Court in 1983 is applicable to the case 
at bar when it held: 
An error is reversible if there is a reasonable 
likelihood that more a favorable result would have been 
obtained by complaining party, in absence of error. 
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217-222. Had the Trial 
Court taken evidence on the parties' income and financial status 
as required by the statutes cited above, a different, more 
favorable result must occur since the defendant was unemployed at 
the time (R Pg. 703, Lines 22-24; Addendum, Exhibit 2) and he told 
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the Commissioner so at the March 17, 1992 Order to Show Cause 
hearing. But the Commissioner imposed upon him the 1988 
Stipulation on the theory that he was bound by it because his 
lawyer had failed to file it. At the March 17, 1992 Order to Show 
Cause hearing, the Commissioner failed to take sufficient evidence 
on the parties1 financial status and thus prevented defendant from 
fully stating his case. Defendant was not given the opportunity 
by the Trial Court to state his case for modification. In a 
similar case, the Supreme Court held: 
Cumulative error in exclusion of evidence offered 
by manufacturers of vehicle in products liability action 
required reversal of judgment in favor of injured 
passenger; manufacturer was unable to present to jury his 
theory of case and was deprived of fair trial. 
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp. , 801 P.2d 920, 928. By not 
following the statutory guidelines as evidenced above., and by 
omitting evidence which would have been provided thereby, the Court 
committed harmful error which prejudiced the Courtfs decision and 
the defendant's rights to a fair hearing. 
IV. IMPROPER EXECUTION. 
Defendant acknowledges that its claim to improper execution 
of the Order on Order to Show Cause is moot. When the District 
Court gave defendant the record for its appeal brief, it never gave 
him file #924400164. Therefore, defendant never had any knowledge 
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of the original signature of Commissioner Maetani on the Order 
until the file was given to him by the District Court recently. 
V. ESTOPPEL, 
Finally, the plaintiff has argued that defendant's estoppel 
argument is barred because it was not raised at the Trial Court 
level. But the transcript of the March 17, 1992 Order to Show 
Cause hearing indicates that the defendant acting pro se did 
attempt to raise this issue with Commissioner Maetani when he said: 
MR. ROWE: Well, we've agreed for all this time 
until now, until the point when I became in a hard 
position. She's been taking all these monies that I've 
been paying for a year and a half and never made any 
issue out of anything. I've got all my checks — 
(R Pg. 691, Lines 4-9; Addendum, Exhibit 2). While this was not 
stated as an attorney would state it, it is sufficient to indicate 
to the Commissioner that plaintiff had done nothing for 1 1/2 
years. In fact, the record shows she did nothing from October of 
1988 until February of 1992 (almost 3 1/2 years) . It must be 
remembered that due to his unemployed state, defendant appeared at 
the March 17 Order to Show Cause Hearing pro se. What he said and 
presented to the Commissioner did not become a part of the record 
until October 30, 1992, long after the final Order by Judge 
Christensen dated June 4, 1992. Therefore, and for the above 
stated reasons, the claim for estoppel was not refined in the 
objection documents, although it was argued to and ignored by the 
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Commissioner. However, there are recognizable exceptions to the 
hard and fast rule barring issues on appeal that were not raised 
on the Trial Court level. LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 804 P.2d 
189, 198 (Utah App. 1991). These exceptions include plain error 
committed at the Trial Court level and when the interests of 
justice require it. Defendant submits that the case at bar is just 
such a case. 
CONCLUSION 
Due to the plaintiff's failure to file any formal arguments 
opposing the documents, motions, affidavits, and objections, or to 
make any arguments on oral argument, the arguments raised in her 
reply brief (a) throucjh (h) above* should not be considered by the 
Court. Essentially, all the plaintiff did at the Trial Court level 
was to file the Stipulation at the March 17, 1992 Order to Show 
Cause hearing, and ask the Court to enforce it. Thereafter, they 
did nothing. But since the Trial Court clearly had before it the 
claims of the parties with respect to material changes of 
circumstances, and request for modification of the Texas decree, 
the Trial Court should have gone further and followed the 
applicable statutes and obtained information under oath from the 
parties. By not doing so, the Trial Court committed plain error, 
violated the defendant's rights and rendered an uninformed 
decision. To state that the foregoing is harmless error is to make 
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mockery of the concept. This Court should vacate both the 
Commissioner's and Judge Christensen1s Orders and remand the case 
back to the Commissioner to take further evidence and render a 
decision in compliance with the applicable statutes and facts which 
would then be before the Court. 
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